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The issue Jecker (2013) addresses, to realize access to health
care in suchaway that all life stages areproperly considered,
is one that is likely to become increasingly important in
the coming years, given the prospects of the life span of
elderly people together with the continuing progress made
in the field of medicine. Jecker’s account demonstrates a
willingness to take seriously the various interests involved
in making decisions in this domain. She rightly points out
a number of problems with Daniels’s prudential lifespan
account (PLA), but whether her own alternative constitutes
a superior account remains to be seen.
The issue of the costs involved with the care for the el-
derlymust be considered in a discussion such as the present
one. Callahan (2012) argues that health care rationing is in-
evitable. Gruenewald (2012) does not consider rationing by
age politically feasible, and proposes focusing on the ques-
tion of whether health care has any added value for some
elderly people, a question thatmay in his viewbemost prof-
itably answered by doctors and patients together through
shared decisions.
Jecker’s account differs from such suggestions. Depart-
ing from an equality of opportunity approach as promul-
gatedbyDaniels (e.g.,Daniels 2001, 2, 3; Saloner andDaniels
2011, 817, 819), and embracing the capabilities approach, she
argues that “the capabilities approach can do for us what
social contract approaches cannot, namely, support a set of
basic entitlements for everyone that make possible a life
with dignity” (11).
Philosophically the most interesting issue is the basis of
the capabilities approach. Like Nussbaum, by whose ac-
count she is inspired, Jecker starts with the assumption
of (human) dignity. This notion is not critically examined.
Since Nussbaum starts from the same principle, it seems
worthwhile to consider her exposition, but this does little to
remedy this lack of justification. For her, human dignity is
an “intuitive idea” (Nussbaum 2006, 70), and “The basic in-
tuitive idea ofmy version of the capabilities approach is that
we begin with a conception of the dignity of the human be-
ing, and of a life that is worthy of that dignity” (Nussbaum
2006, 74).
Jecker says: “The capabilities approach identifies an un-
derlying equality that is rooted not in rationality per se,
but in a wider range of central capabilities we identify as
human” (11). It remains unclear on what basis, if not ratio-
nality, this supposed equality should be acknowledged, and
which specific human capabilities would serve as criteria to
acknowledge it.
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The comparison with (nonhuman) animals is usually
clarifying for this sort of discussion. Nussbaum maintains
that they have dignity, though not in the political sense that
applies to human beings (Nussbaum 2006, 382–384). Jecker
maintains that “The kind of functioning that is characteristic
for a species is what establishes the central capabilities and
associated obligations for each species member” (11). The
human capabilitiesNussbaum lists (Nussbaum2006, 76–78)
are, except for bodily integrity, which humans share with
nonhumans, reducible to reason, if this is taken broadly,
encompassing, for example, the ability to experience human
emotions.
This raises the question of the lower limit: If a person
is born without the relevant capabilities, or loses them in
such a way that they cannot be restored, should he or she
(henceforth) be treated no differently than an animal (at
least in theory), or should the fact that the persopn once
had these capabilities be sufficient to regard him or her
being (fictitiously) endowedwith dignity? In the first case, it
should bemade clearwhere the lower limit is located (at least
roughly; since individual cases may be hard to compare,
demanding a precise criterion would be disproportionate).
In the second case, an arbitrary criterion would obviously
be decisive (namely, the [remaining] human body), so that
the accusation of speciesism would be pertinent.
To be sure, Jecker does refer to bodily integrity as one of
the basic capabilities, but the avoidance of the criticism just
mentioned necessitates a defense of its inclusion, especially
with the case of people who are irreparably cognitively im-
paired in mind.
In addition, pressing questions with regard to the ex-
tent of the investments, which feature prominently in al-
ternative positions, remain unanswered. At what point—if
any—would it be acceptable to cease spendingpublicmeans
to increase people’s capabilities? Jecker speaks of “ensuring
that everyone can reach the end of a human life of normal
length” (11). Shemakes it clear that life extensionmust cease
at that point, but such a limit does not exist when ensuring
“the threshold level of functioning and capability required
for human dignity” is concerned (13).
The problematical nature of “dignity” has already been
pointed out. Would it not be productive to exchange such a
criterion for one that can be defended, in line with Daniels’s
PLA, on the basis of the motivation of contracting parties
themselves? After all, in a democratic system, any policy
must be supported by at least a substantial part of the pop-
ulation, which means that it must be clear what the stake
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of the parties in the distribution of health care may be. To
refer to the example Jecker uses to argue that some elderly
people cannot qualify their position, namely, people with
Alzheimer’s disease, it may be argued that contributing
to funds to combat such diseases and, generally, realizing
health care for the elderly is attractive for younger genera-
tions since they may one day be in the same situation.
It is correct, as Jecker observes, that such a stance may
bring with it an unbalanced focus on earlier stages of life,
but that is a minor problem compared with the difficulties
observed here. In addition, the position of those whose con-
dition is so dire that they may not want to continue their
lives (apart from those already discussed, namely, those
whose capabilities cannot be restored) must be taken into
account (is a subjective desire for euthanasia compatible
with an objective focus on preserving or restoring dignity?).
Forcing people to keep living, whether from the capabilities
approach or not, would arguably be undesirable, both for
the people just mentioned and for society as a whole.
Jecker and Nussbaum are certainly not alone in their
emphasis on (human) dignity, but that does not entail, of
course, that including such a notion in one’s account needs
no justification. Jecker can only use it convincingly if it can
be clarified, first, what makes “dignity” a proper starting
point and, second, how it canbe applied to those individuals
whose capabilities are beyond restoration. 
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